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What Pieces of Limit Order Book Information Matter  
in Explaining Order Choice by  
Patient and Impatient Traders? 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we extend the existing empirical evidence on the relationship 
between the state of the limit order book (LOB) and order choice. Our 
contribution is twofold: first, we propose a sequential ordered probit (SOP) 
model which allows studying patient and impatient traders’ choices 
separately; second, we consider two pieces of LOB information, the best 
quotes and the book beyond the best quotes. We find that both pieces of LOB 
information explain the degree of patience of an incoming trader and, 
afterwards, its order choice. Nonetheless, the best quotes concentrate most of 
the explanatory power of the LOB. The shape of the book beyond the best 
quotes is crucial in explaining the aggressiveness of patient (limit order) 
traders, while impatient (market order) traders base their decisions primarily 
on the best quotes. Patient traders’ choices depend more on the state of the 
LOB on the same side of the market, while impatient traders mostly look at 
the state of the LOB on the opposite side. The aggressiveness of both types of 
traders augments with the inside spread. However, patient (impatient) traders 
submit more (less) aggressive limit (market) orders when the depth of the 
own (opposite) best quote and the length of the own (opposite) side of the 
book increase. We also find that higher depth away from the best ask (bid) 
quote may signal that this quote is “too low (high)”, causing incoming 
impatient buyers (sellers) to be more aggressive and incoming patient sellers 
(buyers) to be more conservative.  
 
Key words: Limit orders, market orders, limit order book, order 
aggressiveness, order-driven markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In order driven markets without designated market makers, liquidity relies on the 
submission of limit orders. Limit orders are stored on an electronic register, called the 
(open) limit order book (henceforth, LOB), to wait for execution. To appreciate how 
and why liquidity varies over time in these venues, it is first necessary to comprehend 
the forces leading an incoming investor to decide between submitting a limit order 
(liquidity supply) or a market order (liquidity demand). Some recent studies illustrate 
that informed and uninformed investors order choices also happen to be essential to 
understand how new information is incorporated into prices (e.g., Harris, 1998, Anand 
et al., 2005, Bloomfield et al., 2005). It has also been shown that order choice 
determines the speed and costs (quality) of execution (e.g., Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996; 
Lo et al., 2002, and Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski, 2000). Finally, the growing interest 
in the optimization of order submissions, an underlying foundation of algorithm trading 
(see O’Hara, 2007), also corroborates the relevance of this topic in microstructure 
research. 
Quite a few recent theoretical studies have evaluated the role the LOB plays in order 
choice. In the dynamic models of Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Handa et al. (2003), 
Foucault et al. (2005), Goettler et al. (2005), and Rosu (2005), LOB dimensions, such as 
the quoted depth on both sides of the LOB and the inside spread, determine the choice 
between market and limit orders. This theoretical interaction between the state of the 
LOB and the traders’ order choices has been extensively corroborated by the empirical 
literature (e.g., Biais et al., 1995; Griffiths et al., 2000; Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski, 
2000; Ranaldo, 2004; Beber and Caglio, 2005, and Ellul et al., 2007).1
1 All this theoretical and empirical literature is revised in detail in the next section. 
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This paper is aimed to contribute to this literature. Our approach differs from 
previous empirical studies in two main aspects. First, we propose a two-stage sequential 
ordered probit (henceforth SOP) model, instead of the more commonly used ordered 
probit model (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2000; Ranaldo, 2004), to model order aggressiveness. 
The SOP model allows studying patient and impatient order choices separately. In the 
first stage of our model, the trader defines herself as patient or eager, as she must choose 
between removing, providing and consuming liquidity, without specifying a particular 
type or order. In most of the previously cited theoretical models on order choice, the 
degree of patience of an incoming trader is exogenously given (by factors such as her 
degree of risk aversion, a higher or lower discount rate, her waiting costs, her liquidity 
needs, or her access to perishable non-publicly known information). In equilibrium, 
patient traders tend to submit limit orders while impatient traders tend to submit market 
orders (e.g., Foucault et al., 2005, and Rosu, 2005). However, these models also 
postulate that the state of the LOB may have an influence in reshaping their degree of 
patience, leading to unanticipated order choices.2 In our empirical analysis, we identify 
patient and impatient traders based on posterior order choices. In this first stage of our 
SOP model, we therefore evaluate the importance of the LOB in determining the 
character of an incoming trader.  
In the second stage of the SOP model, the trader chooses among the different types 
of orders available given their predetermined disposition. Thus, a patient trader chooses 
among the different types of limit orders, either away from, at, or within the best quotes. 
In this decision, the patient trader faces a direct tradeoff between a more favorable limit 
price and a higher risk of non-execution. The impatient trader, though, has to fix the 
 
2 Recent empirical and theoretical research (see Kaniel and Liu, 2006; Harris, 1998; Bloomfield et al., 
2005, and Anand et al., 2005) has shown that, under certain circumstances, traders that are presumed to 
be more inclined to be impatient, such as informed traders, may choose to submit orders that a priori are 
more appropriate for patient traders. 
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relative size of her order. She must choose between a market order that requests less 
than available, all that is available, or more volume than available at the best opposite 
quote. This decision determines the instantaneous price impact of the trade and the 
average immediacy cost per share. Hence, in this second stage, we evaluate the 
relevance of the LOB in the decision of choosing a particular type of order by each 
particular type of trader.  
 Second, we contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on how the 
state of the LOB beyond the best quotes affects order choices. We understand the LOB 
as a set of two main pieces of information, the best quotes and the book beyond the best 
quotes. This distinction is not arbitrary, since even some of the most pre-trade opaque 
markets provide information about the best quotes. Additionally, most of the above-
cited theoretical papers focus on modeling order choice conditional on the best quotes. 
The exception is Goettler et al. (2005). Using simulations, they postulate different 
effects of both pieces of LOB information on order choice by both patient and impatient 
traders. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence confirming many of their 
simulation findings.3 Moreover, previous empirical papers about order aggressiveness 
only consider the best quotes of the LOB. Relevant exceptions are Irvine et al. (2000) 
and Cao et al. (2003). Irvine et al. (2000) show that a liquidity measure based on LOB 
data is more informative about subsequent order flow than the traditional measures 
based on the best quotes. Cao et al. (2003) examine the informativeness of the LOB 
beyond its first level. They conclude that the best quotes lead price discovery and 
provide a better estimator of the true value, but the information derived from the 
secondary level of the book adds some “marginal” explanatory power on future returns. 
 
3 Rosu (2005) also considers the whole LOB in his theoretical model. In this case, however, there are no 
clear cut predictions regarding best quotes versus the book beyond the best quotes. 
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Although our paper inevitably overlaps with Cao et al.’s (2003) paper at some point, the 
motivations and methods differ since they focus on price discovery.  
We use high frequency LOB data on the Stock Exchange Interconnection System of 
the Spanish Stock Exchange (henceforth SSE). In this market, the LOB is available in 
real time to all market participants and market orders are not restricted to the best 
quotes. Hence, the shape of the entire LOB, and not only the best quotes, determines the 
immediacy costs of a market order, as well as the expected time-to-execution of a limit 
order.  
Our main findings are as follows. Consistently with previous empirical studies, we 
find that the state of the LOB matters in explaining the aggressiveness of incoming 
traders. Additionally, we show that both the best quotes and the book beyond the best 
quotes help to shape the degree of patience of incoming buyers and sellers, though most 
of this effect is due to the best quotes. When we look at patient and impatient traders 
separately, we report asymmetric patterns. Thus, incoming patient traders strongly rely 
on the state of the book beyond the best quotes, while impatient traders base their 
strategic decisions primarily on the prevailing best quotes. Both patient and impatient 
traders condition the placement of their limit orders on the inside spread. However, 
patient (impatient) traders’ choices rely on the depth at and away from the best quote 
and the length of the book on the same (opposite) side of the market. Consistently with 
Goettler et al. (2005), our evidence shows that higher depth away from the best ask 
(bid) quote may signal that this quote is “too low (high)”, causing incoming impatient 
buyers (sellers) to place market orders more aggressively and incoming patient sellers 
(buyers) to place limit orders more conservatively. Finally, we show that our SOP 
model provides better in sample and out of sample goodness-of-fit performance than the 
traditional ordered probit model of order aggressiveness.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the pertinent 
literature. In section 3, we introduce the two-stage SOP model and discuss several 
methodological details. In section 4, we describe the database, the sample, and the 
market. In section 5, we present our empirical findings. Finally, in section 6, we 
conclude. 
2. Literature review 
Cohen et al. (1981), Copeland and Galai (1983), and Handa and Schwartz (1996) set 
the basic rational for limit order trading as a trade-off between the non-execution costs 
and the picking-off risk carried by limit orders, and the immediacy costs supported by 
market orders. Other things being equal, the lower the non-execution risk and the higher 
the immediacy costs, the more likely the incoming trader is to submit a limit order. 
Moreover, an increase in adverse selection costs aggravates the winner’s curse problem 
faced by uninformed limit order traders. 
Recent theoretical developments suggest that the state of the LOB may be critical to 
order choice. Parlour (1998) proposes a dynamic equilibrium model in which the 
thickness of a given side of the LOB produces a “crowding out” effect on the limit 
orders on that side, because of the long expected time-to-execution. In contrast, traders 
on the opposite side, anticipating the crowding out effect, are better submitting less 
aggressive orders.   
Foucault (1999) develops a dynamic limit order market in which the mix between 
market and limit orders in equilibrium depends on the fundamental volatility of the 
stock. When volatility increases, the risk of being picked-off by an informed trader 
increases. Limit order traders respond posting higher ask prices and lower bid prices. 
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This makes market orders less attractive and, consequently, the proportion of limit 
orders on the total order flow increases.  
Foucault et al. (2005) develop a dynamic model for an order driven market populated 
by strategic liquidity traders that differ in their waiting costs. In this model, order choice 
is determined by the bid-ask spread, but not by quoted depth.4 For certain spread levels, 
patient (low waiting costs) traders tend to place limit orders, while impatient (high 
liquidity costs traders) tend to submit market orders. As the spread increases and 
surpasses a certain cutoff level, however, all traders tend to choose limit orders to trade. 
Moreover, liquidity suppliers are willing to offer larger spread improvements when the 
spread is large. 
Rosu (2005) proposes a continuous time version of the latter model where 
competition between limit order traders generates endogenous undercutting. The whole 
shape of the LOB is considered, not only the best quotes. By allowing market orders of 
different sizes with probabilities which do not decrease too fast with order size, the 
author shows that limit orders may cluster away from the best quotes. Moreover, traders 
are allowed to dynamically cancel and resubmit their orders as the shape of the LOB 
changes over time. When the LOB is full, “fleeting” orders may happen: a patient trader 
submits a limit order inside the quotes and an opposite patient trader accepts it 
immediately by canceling her limit order and placing a market order. 
In Goettler et al. (2005), liquidity motivated traders with differing degree of patience 
choose whether to buy or sell (or both), either using limit orders or market orders (or 
both), given the state of the LOB and a consensus true value. Traders who are eager to 
buy (sell) are allowed to submit limit orders above (below) the consensus value, which 
 
4 This arises because limit order submitters are not allowed to submit orders at or away from the best 
quotes. 
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means that market orders may result in negative transaction costs. Because the 
consensus value can change, limit orders suffer from picking-off risk. All else equal, the 
higher the probability of execution and the lower the picking-off risk at some price, the 
higher the number of limit orders to sell (buy) submitted at that price. Using 
simulations, they find that, when the spread is wide, a thicker best bid increases 
(decreases) the frequency of inside-the-quotes limit (market) orders to buy. 
Additionally, higher depth above (below) the best ask (bid) quote may signal that the 
best quote may be “too low (high)” resulting in a more aggressive (conservative) order 
placement by incoming buyers. Symmetric patterns are predicted for sellers’ choices.    
In the previous models, asymmetric information is not allowed. Handa et al. (2003) 
extend Foucault’s (1999) model to allow for private information and a varying 
proportion of buyers and sellers. In this model, the thickness of the bid and ask sides of 
the LOB proxy for the proportion of high and low-valuation traders. Buy (sell) 
competition is expected to increase with the proportion of high (low) valuation traders, 
prolonging the expected time-to-execution of limit buy (sell) orders and thus making 
more attractive the use of buy (sell) market orders.  
Regarding empirical research, several papers have shown that limit (market) order 
traders enter in the market when liquidity is scarce (plentiful). Thus, Biais et al. (1995), 
Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000), Beber and Caglio (2005), and Ellul et al. 
(2007), among others, find that limit order submissions inside the quotes occur more 
frequently when the spread widens, while market order submissions are more likely 
when the spread is tight. Consistently, Ranaldo (2004) and Hall and Hautsch (2007) 
show that order aggressiveness and trading intensity both decrease with the bid ask 
spread. Similarly, Ahn et al. (2001) show that when transitory volatility, due to a 
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paucity of limit orders, arises from the ask (bid) side, investors submit more limit orders 
to sell (buy) than market orders to sell (buy). 
Quoted depth on both sides of the market has also been found to matter. Griffiths et 
al. (2000) and Ranaldo (2004) find that traders become more aggressive when their own 
(opposite) side of the book is thicker (thinner). Chakrabarty et al. (2006) conclude that 
investors aimed to reduce the expected time-to-execution of their limit orders should 
submit them when the depth on the own (opposite) side is smaller (greater). Likewise, 
Ellul et al. (2007) document that when quoted depth is large traders are more likely to 
“jump the queue” by submitting limit orders with prices improving existing quotes and 
less likely to submit limit orders with prices equal or worse than current quotes. 
Additionally, positive (negative) bid-ask depth imbalances may anticipate short-term 
price increases (decreases), since they attract additional limit orders on the deep side 
and additional market orders on the thin side, rising the imbalance.  
 Recent studies show that order choice is a more complex phenomenon than the 
simple dichotomy of the uninformed patient trader who submits a limit order and 
passively waits for execution and the impatient trader who submits a market order and 
demands immediate execution. Beber and Caglio (2005) provide evidence that order 
choice and its interaction with the state of the LOB vary in periods characterized by 
higher probability of informed trading. Their findings suggest that informed traders may 
act strategically during these periods, using passive limit orders to hide their 
information. Hasbrouck and Saar (2007) evidence that over one-third of the limit orders 
submitted in INET are cancelled within two seconds. These “fleeting” limit order 
traders are not meant to be patient liquidity providers. Pardo and Pascual (2007) and De 
Winnie and D’hondt (2007) both show that the detection of hidden volume at the best 
quotes temporarily increases order aggressiveness on the opposite side of the market. 
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A related line of research suggests that the state of the LOB may have informational 
content. Seppi (1997), Harris (1998), Moinas (2004), and Kaniel and Liu (2006) provide 
conditions under which informed traders, usually modeled as impatient, may be willing 
to use limit orders. Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Anand et al. (2005) provide 
experimental and empirical evidence supporting these last models’ predictions. More 
recently, Foucault et al. (2006) develop a model in which limit order traders possess 
private information on the occurrence of future information events (“volatility 
information”), such as corporate announcements, and they adjust their order 
submissions to the level of risk perceived. Pascual and Veredas (2006) provide 
supporting evidence. 
3. Methodological details  
3.1. The two-stage sequential ordered probit model 
As previously indicated, we understand order choice as a two stage process. In the 
first stage, the trader is characterized as patient or impatient, as she must choose 
between removing, providing, and consuming liquidity. The degree of patience of the 
incoming trader may be partially exogenous, but we allow it to be shaped by the state of 
different pieces of LOB information. In the second stage, the patient or impatient trader 
chooses among the different type of orders available according to their needs. This 
second step decision is essentially determined by the transient market conditions that, in 
the end, are nested in the state of the LOB. 
An appropriate econometric model to analyze the sequential decision process 
described above is the Sequential Ordered Probit (henceforth SOP) model. In the first 
stage of the process, the degree of impatience of a given trader i arriving at the market is 
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a (linear) function of K observed variables, kX , k = 1,…, K. The aggressiveness index 
*
iA is represented as 
*
1
K A A A A A
i k ik i i ik
A X Z  
=
= + = + , [1] 
where i is the error term and Ak is the slope coefficient associated with the k
th 
regressor (to be defined later). Since *iA is difficult (if not impossible) to observe, 
equation [1] is a latent regression. However, it is possible to infer about the degree of 
the traders’ impatience by observing the specific orders submitted. Thus, the three 
categories of order aggressiveness considered in this first stage (liquidity withdrawal, 
liquidity provision, and liquidity consumption) represent a partition of the state space 
that allows mapping the latent variable into observable discrete values. Let iA be an 
ordinal response variable such that 
*
1
*
1 2
*
2
1 if 
2 if ,
3 if 
A
i
A A
i i
A
i
A
A A
A

 

 	


= < 	

 >
[2] 
with 1
A and 2
A being unknown thresholds, to be estimated along with the slope 
parameters. 1iA = means that the trader decides to leave the market and, accordingly, 
she withdraws liquidity by submitting a cancellation; 2iA = means the trader is willing 
to assume certain degree of non-execution risk and, consequently, she will latterly 
provide liquidity by submitting a limit order; finally, 3iA = means the trader is 
impatient and requires an immediate execution of their trading interests; at the end, she 
will therefore choose among the different types of market orders.  
The probability that the incoming trader is of type j is 
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*
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
A A A A A A A
ij j i j j i j iP P A P Z P Z    = < < =    , [3] 
with 0 =
A and 3 = +
A . Assuming that the probability distribution of the error 
terms i is normal, Pr( ) ( )
A A A A
j i j iZ Z  =  , where (.) ( )  is the normal 
cumulative distribution function.5 The corresponding log-likelihood is 
3
1 1
ln ln
n
A A A
ij ij
i j
L d P
= =
= , [4] 
where 1Aijd = if iA j= and 0
A
ijd = otherwise, maximized with respect to 
A
k , 1
A and 
2
A .
In the second stage of the SOP model, we analyze order choice by patient and 
impatient traders separately. Suppose, for instance, that trader i is patient.6 The ordinal 
response variable iL takes three possible values, given by the unobservable thresholds 
1
L and 2
L ,
*
1
*
1 2
*
2
1 if 
2 if ,  
3 if 
L
i
L L
i i
L
i
L
L L
L

 

 	


= < 	

 >
where *iL represents the latent aggressiveness of the limit order trader, 
*
1
K L L L L L
i k ik i i ik
L X Z  
=
= + = + .
Whenever * 1
L
iL 	 the trader submits a non-aggressive limit order to buy (sell) below 
(above) the best bid (ask), and 1iL = ; whenever 
*
1 2
L L
iL < 	 , the trader submits a limit 
 
5 If we assume a logistic distribution, equations [1] and [2] will define an ordered logit model. 
Preliminary estimations provide identical results under either assumption. Since related studies such as 
Griffiths et al. (2000) and Ranaldo (2004) assume normality, we also base our analysis on the ordered 
probit model. 
6 The following discussion is equivalent for an impatient trader that has to choose between three types of 
market orders, from lower to higher aggressiveness: a non-aggressive market order, a market-to-limit 
order, and an aggressive market order. In terms of notation, we would replace L by M.
Page 14 of 45
E-mail: quant@tandf.co.uk  URL://http.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/rquf
Quantitative Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
14
order to buy (sell) at the current best bid (ask), and 2iL = ; if 
*
2
L
iL > , the trader seeks a 
short time-to-execution and submits a limit order inside the best quotes, and 3iL = .
The probability that an incoming trader submits a, say, limit order at the quotes is 
2 2
A L
i iP P where 2
A
iP is the probability of a patient trader arriving at the first stage ( 2iA = )
and 2
L
iP is the unconditional probability of the patient trader submitting a limit order at 
the quotes ( 2iL = ) at the second stage. Let 1
L
ild = if iL l= and 0
L
ild = otherwise, for 
1,2,3l = . Because 2
A
iP does not depend on l and 
3
1
1Lill d= = , the log-likelihood of the 
second stage for the patient traders is  
3
2
1 1 1
ln ln
n n
L A L L
i il il
i i l
L P d P
= = =
= +  , [5] 
The first term on the RHS of [5] does not play any role in the maximization of the log-
likelihood, since the latter is maximized with respect to the parameters on the second 
RHS term ( Lk , 1
L and 2
L ).  
The SOP approach is conceptually different to the OP approach. The latter presumes 
that any trader arriving at the market, independently of their degree of patience, chooses 
among all the possible type of orders. That is,  
*
1
*
1 2
*
7
1 if O
2 if ,
7 if O
O
i
O O
i
i
O
i
O
O

 

 	


< 	
=



 >
M
where *
1
  
=
= + = +K O Oi k ik i i ikO X Z  and 1Pr( ) ( ) ( )  = = =   O O Oik i k i k iP O k Z Z .
In this case,  1iO = is a cancellation, 2iO = is a non-aggressive limit orders, and so on 
and so forth. In contrast to the SOP model, an increase in ikX , for example, the bid-ask 
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spread, will be predicted to affect in exactly the same manner to all types of traders 
through a single parameter. With the SOP model however, an increase in the bid-ask 
spread may affect differently the order choice of patient and impatient traders through 
one parameter for the first stage and two parameters for the second stage. 
The extra computational demand of the SOP model is marginal since the 
optimization of the SOP model boils down to the optimization of two OP models. 
Nonetheless, the OP and the SOP models are not nested because the estimated 
probabilities of observing the different events in the second stage and, hence, the 
likelihood function, depend on the probabilities of the first stage, as shown in equation 
[5].  
A general drawback of all these models is that, given a change in a regressor, it is 
only the direction of change in the probabilities of the two extreme cases that can be 
unambiguously determined from the sign of the associated coefficient.7 The more levels 
or categories, the more limited the model. Thus, in an OP model with seven levels of 
aggressiveness, as that suggested in previous studies, the sign of the coefficients may 
fail to describe the direction of change in the probabilities of the five intermediate 
categories. This problem is significantly lessened with the SOP model since each node 
in the decision process involves only three possible outcomes and, thus, only one 
category is left in each stage with an ambiguous probability change. We compute 
marginal probabilities to clarify the direction of the change in probabilities. They 
measure the expected increase in the probability of each category after a marginal 
increase in a given regressor. In the first stage, the marginal effect of, say, the kth 
regressor on the probability of iA taking value m is, 
 
7 See Borooah (2001, p. 23-24) and Greene (2003, p. 738-739) for further details on this issue. 
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A
1
A A
1 2
A
2
( - )                            if 1
( ) ( - ) ( - )           if 2
( - )                               if 3
A A
i k
A A Ai
i i kA
ik A A
i k
Z m
P A m Z Z m
X
Z m
  
    
  
 =

 =  =  =  

=
[6] 
where ( )  is the normal density function. For the second stage, marginal probabilities 
are defined analogously. 
3.2. Order aggressiveness 
We use a generally accepted categorization of order aggressiveness originally 
proposed by Biais et al. (1995) that has been used, with some minimum variations, in 
previous papers. From the most to the least aggressive category, 
• C7: Buy (sell) orders that demand more volume than is available at the best 
prevailing ask (bid) and are allowed to walk up (down) the book.  
• C6: Buy (sell) orders that demand more volume than is available at the best ask 
(bid) but are not allowed to walk up (down) the book.  
• C5: Buy (sell) orders that demand less volume than is available at the best ask 
(bid).  
• C4: Orders with prices lying between the best bid and offer.  
• C3: Buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best bid (ask).  
• C2: Buy (sell) orders with prices below (above) the best bid (ask). 
• C1: Cancellations.  
Categories C5 to C7 imply total or partial immediate execution of the order and, 
therefore, consume liquidity. These are the possible choices we consider for an 
impatient trader in the second stage of the SOP model. Categories C2 to C4 imply non-
immediate execution and, therefore, provide liquidity. These are the possible choices we 
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consider for a patient trader in the second stage of the SOP model. Category C1 
includes orders that withdraw liquidity, and they are to be chosen exclusively in the first 
stage of the SOP model. 
3.3. Pieces of LOB information 
We consider two large pieces of LOB information. The best quotes (henceforth BQ)
set includes the following variables, all of them defined with respect to the incoming 
order:  
• SPR: Bid-ask spread.  
• NS1 (NO1): Pending number of orders on the same (opposite) side of the book.8
The additional quotes (hereafter AQ) set includes,  
• NS25 (NO25): Accumulated number of orders on the same (opposite) side of the 
book. 
• LS12 (LS25): Distance, in ticks, between the best and the second best (the second 
best and fifth best) quotes on the same side of the book. 
• LO12 (LO25): Distance between the best and the second best (the second best and 
fifth best) quotes on the opposite side of the book.  
The information contained in the second set of variables could be thought of as 
consisting of two components: Redundant information already contained in the best 
quotes, and brand new information only present in the secondary levels. To isolate the 
latter piece of information, the AQ set is defined as the residuals of a linear regression of 
each of its components on the contemporaneous and lagged values of the variables in 
 
8 We also considered the quoted depth as an alternative to the number of orders. The correlation between 
both proxies was very high, so that our main findings barely differed. In this final version, we only report 
the analysis based on the number of orders. 
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the BQ set. In this way, any explanatory power attributed to the secondary levels of the 
book will be (linearly) unconnected with the information on the best quotes. 
We consider three alternative specifications for the SOP model. The “Baseline” 
model (BM) only includes the first lag of the dependent variable in the explanatory 
variable set; the “Best Quotes” model (BQM) adds the BQ set of explanatory variables 
to the BM model; the “Complete Book” model (CBM) adds the AQ set of explanatory 
variables to the BQM. In the next sections, we will evaluate the relative performance of 
each specification in each stage of the SOP model both in-sample and out-of-sample. 
We will also compare the performance of the CBM-SOP model with an alternative 
CBM-OP model. 
3.4. Hypotheses  
The choice of LOB variables described above is supported by the existing literature. 
According to Foucault (1999), Foucault et al. (2005), and Ranaldo (2004), we 
hypothesize that the wider the spread, the higher the frequency of patient traders on the 
first stage of the SOP model. A wider spread increases the costs of trading aggressively. 
In the second stage, we expect a lower proportion of the least aggressive market orders 
(C5) in favor of most aggressive (C7) market orders as the inside spread increases. This 
hypothesis builds on the fact that C7 traders bear higher immediacy costs than those 
given by the inside spread, since they consume more than the depth available at the best 
opposite quote. Contrarily, immediacy costs of C5 orders are entirely determined by the 
spread. We therefore expect C5 orders to be more sensible than C7 orders to variations 
in the inside spread. Regarding limit orders, according to Foucault (1999), Foucault et 
al. (2005), and Goettler et al. (2005) we should expect limit order traders to become 
more aggressive in their price improvements as the bid-ask spread widens. Therefore, 
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we hypothesize limit order traders to submit more C4 (inside the best quotes) limit 
orders as the spread increases.  
Regarding quoted depth at the best quotes, the crowding out effect of limit orders 
predicted by Parlour (1998) sets the basis for our hypotheses. Additionally, in Handa et 
al.’s (2003) framework higher imbalances between buyers and sellers are to be 
associated with increased order aggressiveness. Ranaldo (2004), Ahn et al. (2001), and 
Ellul et al. (2007), among others, provide supporting empirical evidence. Accordingly, 
in the first stage of our SOP model, we expect an increase in the rate of arrival of 
impatient (patient) buyers (sellers) when the quoted depth at the best bid quote 
increases. Similarly, increases in the depth at the best ask is expected to encourage more 
impatient (patient) sellers (buyers).  
With respect to limit order traders in the second stage, a larger depth at the best quote 
makes it more attractive to “jump the queue” by submitting inside the quote (C4) limit 
orders and conversely less attractive to submit limit orders at the quote (C3) or away 
from the best quote (e.g., Ellul et al., 2007). Traders with stale limit orders may also 
engage in a “chasing” strategy (see Hasbrouck and Saar, 2007) consisting of canceling 
the old limit orders and resubmitting them more aggressively. Moreover, according to 
Parlour (1998), we expect patient traders on the thinner side of the market to submit less 
aggressive limit orders, anticipating an increase in the arrival rate of market orders from 
the opposite side.  
Coppejans et al. (2004) provide evidence that the actual costs incurred by traders are 
significantly lower than the costs that would be incurred under a raw strategy that would 
ignore time-variations in liquidity, particularly for large trades. They conclude that 
traders act strategically, taking advantage of periods of liquidity surpluses and avoiding 
liquidity deficits. Their finding also agrees with traders fitting order size to the state of 
Page 20 of 45
E-mail: quant@tandf.co.uk  URL://http.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/rquf
Quantitative Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
20
the LOB, for example, by splitting orders into smaller (C2) ones, or by submitting 
market-to-limit (C3) orders. Thus, in Mendelson and Tunca (2000), discretionary 
liquidity traders adjust the order size along with the changing market depth, equalizing 
trading costs across sizes. Similarly, De Winnie and D’hondt (2007) and Pardo and 
Pascual (2007) both show that the detection of hidden volume on the best opposite 
quote fosters order aggressiveness. Traders behave strategically, however, and just seize 
the opportunity for depth improvement, without consuming more than available at the 
best opposite quote. In accordance with the previous findings, we would expect the 
available depth at the best quotes of the LOB to shape the size of the incoming market 
orders, but we would not expect an increase in the proportion of aggressive market 
orders. Namely, we hypothesize an increase in the submission of C5 market orders in 
the second stage of our SOP model as NO1 goes deeper.  
Goettler et al.’s (2005) model predicts that a deep book away form the best ask (bid) 
quote signals that the best quote price is “too low” (“too high”). Their simulation results 
suggest that the higher NS25, the lower the frequency of both market orders and 
aggressive limit orders, and the higher the frequency of limit orders at or away from the 
best quote. Contrarily, higher NO25 may lead to more aggressive order submissions. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize NS25 (NO25) to decrease (increase) the aggressiveness of 
both patient and impatient traders order choices in the second stage of the SOP model. 
Regarding the first stage of the SOP model, our prediction is more ambiguous. Order 
imbalances beyond the best quotes may reinforce Parlour’s (1998) crowding out effect. 
Thus, increased competition in the form of depth below (above) the best bid (ask) may 
result in a higher frequency of impatient (patient) buyers (sellers). Deep book 
imbalances may also anticipate short-term price movements, as suggested by Kavajecz 
and Odders-White (2004). Since rising (falling) markets are expected to prolong 
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(shorten) the time-to-execution of limit buy (sell) orders, a thick bid (ask) book beyond 
the best quotes may induce incoming buyers (sellers) to be more impatient and 
incoming sellers (buyers) to be more patient.9 The simulations in Goettler et al. (2005), 
however, point towards the opposite prediction (see Tables IV and VI in p. 2170). We 
therefore treat the impact of NS25 and NO25 on the first stage of the SOP model as a 
theory-free empirical issue.   
“Length” measures are less common in microstructure research. Given the quoted 
depth, the length of the LOB determines the expected price impact of large market 
orders. Thus, LO12 measures the demanded compensation for consuming more than 
available at the best opposite quote. According to Glosten (1994), a lengthy ask (bid) 
book may indicate that potential sellers (buyers) have higher upper (lower) tail 
expectations. As long as this signaling effect outweighs the increased costs of trading, a 
lengthy ask (bid) book may increase buy (sell) pressure (see Hall and Hautsch, 2007). 
Similarly, a lengthy book on the ask side may suppose a longer time-to-execution for a 
limit buy order, causing incoming buyers to be more aggressive and, consequently, 
reducing the waiting costs of incoming patient sellers. Following this reasoning, we 
expect the length of the book to reinforce the crowding out effect on the first stage of 
the SOP model: the length of the ask (bid) side is expected to be positively correlated 
with the frequency of impatient buyers (sellers) and positively correlated with the 
probability of patient sellers (buyers). Regarding the second stage, all else equal, we 
would expect a high LO12 to discourage the most aggressive type of market order (C7) 
traders because of the increased costs of transaction. A narrow LS12 may signal a 
crowded LOB, which may encourage patient traders to place their orders in front of the 
queue so as to gain time precedence. In line with Glosten (1994), we would also expect 
 
9 Beber and Caglio (2005) and Chan (2005) report a positive connection between momentum and order 
aggressiveness. 
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high values of LS12 and LS25 to discourage aggressive limit order submissions since 
they may signal a high perceived picking-off risk.  
4. Market background and data 
The Spanish Stock Exchange Interconnection System (henceforth SIBE) is the 
electronic platform that, since 1995, holds all the Spanish stocks that achieve pre-
determined minimum levels of trading frequency and liquidity.10 Every order submitted 
to the system is electronically routed to a centralized LOB. 
The SIBE is organized as an order-driven market with a daily continuous trading 
session, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., and two call auctions that determine the opening 
and closing prices. During the continuous trading session, a trade takes place if an only 
if an order hits the quotes. Pre-arranged trades are not allowed, and price-improvements 
are impossible.11 There are no market makers, and there is no floor trading. The market 
is governed by a strict price-time priority rule. The minimum price variation (tick) 
equals €0.01 for prices below €50 and €0.05 for prices above €50. The minimum trade 
size is one share.  
There are three basic types of orders: market, limit, and market-to-limit. Market 
orders execute against the best prices on the opposite side of the LOB. Any excess that 
cannot be executed at the best bid (ask) quote is executed at less favorable prices by 
walking down (up) the book until the order is fulfilled. Market-to-limit orders are 
limited to the best opposite-side quote at the time of entry. Any excess that cannot be 
executed is converted into a limit order. Finally, limit orders are to be executed at the 
 
10 According to the Focus Monthly Bulleting of June 2006 of the World Federation of Exchanges 
(www.world-exchanges.org), the Spanish market is the fourth European market in terms of market 
capitalization ($US 1,116,146 millions), right after the LSE ($US 3,370,070 millions), Euronext ($US 
3,192,428 millions) and the Deustche Bourse ($US 1,412,118 millions). The SSE is also the 4th European 
market in terms of total value of share trading. 
11 Because of the allowance of hidden limit orders, however, depth improvements are possible. 
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limit price or better. Any unexecuted part of the order is stored in front of the book at 
the limit price. Market orders belong to the C5 to C7 categories of aggressiveness 
previously defined, market-to-limit orders are C6 orders, and limit orders are C2 to C4 
orders.12 By default, all orders expire at the end of the session.13 
Our database consists of all the updates of the 5 best bid/ask quotes of the LOB and 
all trades executed from July to December 2000 (124 trading days) during the 
continuous trading session. The LOB data includes quotes, disclosed depth, and the 
number of orders supporting each quote. All the movements of the book are time-
stamped to the nearest hundredth of a second. The trading data is updated each time the 
best quotes change. It details the trade price, the trade size, and the best quotes before 
and after each trade. We match both files using an algorithm introduced by Pardo and 
Pascual (2007). Once matched, we can classify all the LOB updates into one of the 
seven categories of aggressiveness formerly defined. It is also easy to distinguish 
 
12 Limit orders at a price equal to the best quote on the opposite side of the book and of smaller (larger) 
size than the quantity available at that opposite quote cannot be distinguished in practice from market 
(market to limit) orders. Therefore, we pool them as C5-market (C6-market to limit) orders. Similarly, we 
put together limit orders that walk up or down the book and become totally fulfilled with C7-market 
orders, and market-to-limit orders with size smaller that the available depth as C5-market orders. Limit 
orders that walk up or down the book but are only partially executed represent less than 0.3% of all orders 
submitted. These orders are also considered C7. By a limit order that walks up or down the book we mean 
a limit order to buy (sell) which price is above (below) the prevailing best ask (bid) quote and which size 
is larger than the depth available at the best opposite quote. This order will consume the best ask (bid) 
quote on the book, and the excess will be executed at less favorable ask (bid) prices until it either fully 
executes or reaches a quote above (below) the limit price. 
13 For all type of orders, brokers may specify special conditions: (a) “Execute or eliminate” means the 
order must be executed immediately. In case of partial execution, the unexecuted part must be eliminated 
right away. (b) “Fill or kill” also requires instantaneous execution. In this case, partial execution is not 
possible. The order must be fully executed or fully eliminated. (c) “Minimum execution” implies that at 
least a given part of the order must be immediately executed. If the minimum execution is not possible, 
the whole order must be eliminated. If the minimum execution is possible, the rest of the order must be 
treated as a regular order. (d) Finally, partially undisclosed limit orders, known as “iceberg” orders, are 
allowed. Our database does not identify orders submitted with special conditions. Hidden orders, for 
example, are only detectable upon execution. In practical terms, orders with these conditions are therefore 
undistinguishable from some of the seven categories of aggressiveness defined above. In this paper, we 
consider the undisclosed depth when classifying orders. We classify all orders relative to the total depth 
(disclosed plus undisclosed) available at the best quotes. Market orders with size larger than the disclosed 
depth at the best-opposite quote on the book are classified as C7 if and only if they exhaust all the 
available depth at that quote. 
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between buyer and seller initiated trades because the LOB always acts as the passive 
side on every trade. 
The SSE database has some drawbacks we consider convenient to mention. We 
observe pictures of the whole book, but we do not have information order by order. 
Therefore, we cannot follow the history of all the orders submitted. This is a limitation 
because we can not compute the realized time-to-execution or time-to-cancellation of all 
limit orders. We do not have LOB information about the opening and closing auctions. 
We must therefore exclude these relevant periods for price discovery from our analysis. 
The initial LOB each day, however, corresponds to the unexecuted limit orders coming 
from the pre-auction phase. So, the role these orders play in order choice is considered. 
Moreover, the SSE allows submitting iceberg orders. Recent empirical studies (see De 
Winnie and D’hondt, 2007, and Pardo and Pascual, 2007) have shown that the state of 
the LOB matters in choosing between disclosed and undisclosed limit orders. Moreover, 
hidden volume, when revealed to the marketplace, affects order choice by increasing 
order aggressiveness on the opposite side of the market. It would be therefore desirable 
to extend our analysis by including iceberg orders either as an additional possible order 
choice by incoming traders or as a conditional variable for order choice. Unfortunately, 
we can only detect the presence of iceberg orders at execution and, even then, we 
cannot always know the exact amount of the hidden volume. Thus, we leave this 
possible extension for future research.  
Our initial sample consists of all the stocks that were part of the official market 
index, the IBEX-35, during 2000.14 We exclude one stock involved in a merger. Table I 
provides descriptive statistics on the 36 stocks conforming the final sample. It is 
 
14 The IBEX-35 is composed of the 35 most liquid and active SIBE-listed stocks during the most recent 
six-month control period. The composition is ordinarily revised twice a year. Extraordinary revisions are 
possible due to major events like mergers or new stock issues. During 2000, a total of 37 stocks were 
index constituents.  
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possible to appreciate huge differences between them in terms of both liquidity and 
activity. The most illiquid stock in the sample (ALB) shows a bid-ask spread which is 
14.2 times larger (in number of ticks) than the most liquid stock (SCH), a quoted depth 
at the ask side (in number of shares) which is 60.5 times smaller, and a distance 
between the first and the fifth ask quotes in the book, also in number of ticks, which is 5 
times larger. Similarly, the most active stock (TEF) presents an average daily volume 
(in shares) and an average daily number of trades which are, respectively, 157 and 86.7 
times larger than the corresponding statistics for the least frequently traded stocks 
(ANA and AUM). Our sample is representative in the sense that it represents about 94% 
of the total volume traded and 64% of the total market capitalization. 
[Table I] 
In the next section, we evaluate the relative performance of each SOP model in 
section 3, both in-sample and out-of-sample. For in-sample analyses, we use data from 
July to November 2000. For out-of-sample analyses, we use December 2000 data.  
5. Empirical findings 
Table II provides summary statistics about order aggressiveness. We classify each 
update of the LOB into the 7 categories of aggressiveness defined earlier. We provide 
the distribution of orders by category over all the orders submitted (Panel A) and over 
buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders (Panel B). The most frequent category is small 
market orders (C5), which represents 40.39% of all orders submitted. The least frequent 
category is that of large market orders (C7), which represent 3.75% of all orders.15 
According to Panel A, 35.39% of the orders submitted provide liquidity, 50.21% 
consume liquidity, and 14.41% withdraw liquidity. We do not find remarkable 
 
15 Similar patterns are reported by Ranaldo (2004), for the Swiss Stock Exchange, Griffiths et al (2000) 
for the Toronto Stock Exchange, Biais et al (1995) for the Paris Bourse, now Euronext, Al-Suhaibani and 
Kryzanowski (2000) for the Saudi Stock Market, and Beber and Caglio (2005) for the NYSE. 
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differences between buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders. Even though our sample 
period is biased by a bear phase, the IBEX constituents, for the most part, remained 
relatively stable. 
[Table II] 
Table III summarizes the maximum likelihood estimation of the first stage of the 
CBM SOP model for the 36 stocks. We estimate separated models for buyer-initiated 
traders and seller-initiated traders. We also provide the marginal probabilities in [6] 
evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. 
[Table III] 
We find a strong first order positive autocorrelation in order aggressiveness. That is, 
the probability of observing an aggressive type of order increases if the immediately 
preceding event on the same side of the market is also an aggressive order. This is 
consistent with the “diagonal effect” reported by Biais et al. (1995), but it is at odds 
with Parlour (1998), who predicts that submitting an aggressive order is less attractive 
when the immediately preceding order at the same side is a limit order. Similar order-
by-order serial correlation in order type is provided by Ellul et al. (2007).16 
The estimated coefficients for the BQ set are consistent with previous empirical 
findings (using the OP model), and corroborate the hypotheses posted in section 3. A 
wider spread increases the probability of the incoming trader being patient, consistently 
with Foucault (1999), a finding supported by almost all the stocks in our sample. 
Consistent with Parlour’s (1998) crowding out effect, we find that the thicker the book 
on the buy (sell) side, the more impatient the incoming buyer (seller) becomes. 
Marginal probabilities show that, as the bid-ask spread (depth at the own side) increases 
 
16 Biais et al. (1995) argue that this diagonal effect may reflect imitative behavior by uninformed traders, 
order splitting, traders reacting to the same public information, or competition between liquidity 
providers. 
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the probability of the most impatient type of trader decreases (increases), while the 
probability of the most patient types increases (decreases).  
Regarding depth at the best opposite quote, we find a statistically significant and 
negative relationship, consistent with Parlour’s (1998) prediction that a thicker book on 
the sell (buy) side will decrease the impatience of new buyers (sellers). Marginal 
probabilities, however, show that sellers’ behavior is at odds with them expecting a 
crowding out effect. This finding might be a result of the bear market affecting our 
sample period. However, Beber and Caglio (2005) report the same asymmetry for the 
NYSE using the TORQ database. They argue this finding indicates that sellers are more 
impatient than buyers, and prefer to take advantage of the lower costs of liquidity. In 
any case, the marginal probabilities show that SPR and the NS1 have a major impact, 
with NO1 being less relevant. 
Regarding the AQ set, Table III shows these variables are less important than the best 
quotes in characterizing incoming traders’ patience. For secondary depth (NO25 and 
NS25), our findings support the hypothesis that the book beyond the best quotes may 
reinforce the crowding out effect predicted by Parlour (1998). In addition, the marginal 
probabilities confirm that, in this case, the finding is consistent among sellers and 
buyers. Therefore, in our sample, the crowding out effect for sellers is fully satisfied 
when we consider the secondary book depth. We also obtain a weak negative effect of 
LS12 and a strong positive effect of LO12 on order aggressiveness. As previously 
discussed, a small LS12 may signal a crowded book on the same side of the market as the 
incoming trader. This variable therefore reinforces the findings obtained with NS1 and 
NS25. Moreover, a rational buyer (seller) will interpret a higher dispersion on the ask 
(bid) side of the book as a longer expected time-to-execution for a new limit order to 
buy (sell), inducing the incoming buyer (seller) to be more aggressive. Finally, both 
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LS25 and LO25 tend to decrease the frequency of aggressive traders. In terms of statistical 
significance, however, this last relationship is weak. 
Table IV shows, for the first stage of the SOP model, the relative in-sample and out-
of-sample performance of each of the three model specifications (BM, BQM and 
CBM). We report four alternative goodness-of-fit measures that correspond to the in-
sample (adjusted) pseudo-R2s of McFadden (1973, p.121), Maddala (1983, p.39) with 
the Cragg and Uhler (1970) correction, Aldrich and Nelson (1984) with the Veall and 
Zimmermann (1992) correction, and McKelvey and Zavoina (1975).17 For each 
measure, we provide its median across the 36 stocks for the BM, its percentage increase 
for the BQM with respect to the BM, and for the CBM with respect to the BQM. 
[Table IV] 
The results across measures are similar. Consider the McKelvey and Zavoina’s 
pseudo-R2. When the BQ variables are added to the simplest autoregressive model, we 
get an in-sample fit improvement of 51.68% for sellers and 82.75% for buyers. In 
addition, when the whole LOB is taken into account the fit improves an additional 
52.40% for sellers and 42.57% for buyers. This increasing pattern indicates that the 
state of the book determines, at least partially, the nature of the incoming trader. 
Moreover, traders examine not only the best quotes, but also the less aggressive quotes. 
Our results seem to attribute a more noteworthy role to the book beyond the best quotes 
than it should be expected given Cao et al’s (2003) findings. Similarly, from the out-of-
 
17 No one of these measures is universally accepted or employed. The values between zero and one have 
no natural interpretation, though it has been suggested that the pseudo-R2 value increases as the fit of the 
model improves. In a comparative analysis performed by Veall and Zimmermann (1996), these authors 
conclude that, for the particular case of the ordered probit model, the pseudo-R2 due to McKelvey-
Zavoina outperforms the other measures and has a strong numerical relationship to the OLS-R2 in the 
latent variable. The Veall-Zimmermann and the Cragg-Uhler’s measures also perform reasonably well. 
We include the McFadden’s pseudo-R2 because it is the most common in statistical packages. For a 
review of all these goodness-of-fit measures see Veall and Zimmermann (1996). As in standard 
regression analysis, we use adjusted versions of these measures to take into account the inclusion of 
additional explanatory variables.  
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sample McKelvey-Zavoina (adjusted) pseudo-R2, we observe that the predictive 
capacity of the BQM outperforms that of the BM by a median 108.96% for sellers and 
141.22% for buyers. When the complete book is considered there is an additional 
improvement of 31.39% for sellers and 40.11% for buyers. 
As an alternative to the previous point measures of goodness-of-fit, we perform the 
following forecasting exercise. Using the in-sample estimated coefficients, we compute 
the one-step-ahead forecasting probability for each of the 3 categories of aggressiveness 
and for each out-of-sample observation. Then, we compute how often the SOP model 
beats the unconditional probability given by the in-sample relative frequency of each 
category. The results are summarized at the bottom panel of Table IV. We find that the 
CBM outperforms the BQM and the BM. The CBM beats the unconditional frequency 
more often than the other two models for 47.22% for both buyers and sellers; only for 
22.22% (16.67%) of the stocks the BQM outperforms the other two models for sellers 
(buyers). We also provide a direct comparison between models. The CBM does better 
than the BQM for 94.44% (97.22%) of the stocks in sellers (buyers) model, in the sense 
that the CBM allocates a higher probability to the actual category of aggressiveness than 
the BQM. Both book models usually improve on the BM. 
Table V summarizes the estimation of the second stage of the CBM. We report the 
coefficients for patient (Panel A) and impatient (Panel B) traders, distinguishing 
between buyer and seller-initiated orders, in separated panels. We also provide the 
marginal probabilities in each case. 
[Table V] 
Table V provides evidence that the bid-ask spread is very important in determining 
both patient and impatient order choices. Marginal probabilities in Panel A show that 
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patient traders submit more aggressive limit orders (C4) as the bid-ask spread increases. 
This finding is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Foucault et al. (2005), with 
previous empirical evidence (e.g., Biais et al., 1995, and Ranaldo, 2004), and with our 
hypothesis in section 3. Regarding impatient traders, marginal probabilities in Panel B 
report a strong decrease in the likelihood of submitting C5 orders, which favors an 
increase in the proportion of C6 and C7 orders. This finding provides support to our 
hypothesis in section 3 that an increase in the inside spread has more dramatic 
consequences on the least aggressive type of traders among all the impatient ones.  
Regarding quoted depth at the best quotes, Table V shows that same-side (opposite-
side) depth is more relevant for patient traders’ (impatient traders’) order choices. 
Marginal probabilities in Panel A show that patient traders facing a thick best quote (a 
large NS1) are more likely to “jump the queue”, which is consistent with Handa et al.’s 
(2003) arguments, among others. As hypothesized, the submission of inside-the-quotes 
(C4) limit orders increases as NS1 augments, in detriment of less aggressive types (C3 
and C2) of  limit orders. Contrarily, NO1 is only statistically significant for 3 (2) stocks 
for patient buyers (sellers).  
Even though a deep best bid (ask) increases the rate of arrival of impatient buyers 
(sellers) (see Table III), the marginal probabilities in Panel B indicate that these 
additional traders use to submit C5 (non-aggressive) market orders. This last finding is 
week, anyway: NS1 is only statistically significant for 14 (10) stocks for impatient 
sellers (buyers). Quite the opposite, the thickness of the best opposite quote has a strong 
effect on order choice by impatient traders. As hypothesized in section 3, the higher the 
NO1, the higher (lower) the proportion of impatient traders choosing C5 (C6 and C7) 
market orders. This behavior is observed for both buyers and sellers, despite the 
asymmetric pattern evidenced in the first step of the SOP model. Thus, impatient traders 
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take advantage of liquidity surpluses and adjust the size of their orders to the available 
opposite depth, probably seeking to equalize the trading costs across trade sizes, as in 
Mendelson and Tunca (2000). 
Albeit the BQ set is much more relevant, the AQ set also determines order choice at 
the second stage of the SOP model. Panel A in Table V shows that patient buyers’ 
(sellers’) order choices depend more on the book beyond the best bid (ask) than on the 
book beyond the best ask (bid). Among all the AQ variables, LS12 is found to be the 
most relevant. In general, the length of their own side of the book decreases the 
aggressiveness of incoming limit order traders. As with NS1, a narrow LS12 may signal a 
crowded LOB (or a low picking-off risk), which encourages patient traders to place 
their orders in front of the queue so as to gain time precedence. We also find NS25 to be 
negatively related to the aggressiveness of patient traders, which is totally consistent 
with the simulation results in Goettler et al. (2005). A crowded book beyond the best 
ask (bid) quote signals the best quote is too low (high) leading incoming patient traders 
on the same side to be more conservative. As far as we know, this is the first paper 
providing empirical support to Goettler et al.’s (2005) prediction. The remaining same-
side variables are less critical. The incidence of the opposite side of the book on the 
aggressiveness of the incoming limit order trader, as given by NO1, LO12 and LO25, is 
weak.  
With regard to impatient traders, marginal probabilities in Panel B of Table V point 
towards LO12 as the most remarkable determinant of order choice in the AQ set. As 
discussed in section 3, as LO12 increases it becomes more attractive to submit non-
aggressive (C5) market orders, and less attractive to submit aggressive (C7) market 
orders. We also find that NO25 is positively related to the aggressiveness of the 
incoming impatient traders on the opposite side of the market, which is consistent with 
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Goettler et al.’s (2005) simulation results. Hence, C7 buy (sell) orders are more frequent 
when the LOB away from the best ask (bid) quote signals that the best ask (bid) is too 
low (high). Consistently, we also report a negative effect of NS25 (also LS12 and LS25) on
the aggressiveness of the incoming impatient trader. 
Table VI reports the relative in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the second 
stage of the three SOP models considered.  
[Table VI] 
The in-sample analysis shows that limit order traders’ choices crucially depend on 
the book information. There is a median improvement 134.48% for sellers and 177.09% 
for buyers when the best quotes are taken into account. More important, the CBM 
improves on the BQM by a median of 263.19% for sellers and 210.51% for buyers, 
implying that patient traders take their decisions by examining not only the best quotes 
but also the book beyond the best quotes. The out-of-sample (adjusted) pseudo-R2 leads 
to the same conclusion. In addition, the CBM obtains the best scores against the relative 
frequency rule. It always outperforms the BQM, allocating higher probabilities to the 
actual event than the BQM and the BM.  
The results for the impatient traders are remarkably different. Table VI shows that 
impatient traders’ order choices depend, to a great extent, on the best quotes. There is a 
median in-sample fit improvement of 1100% for sellers and 991% for buyers when the 
BQ set is added to the simplest model. However, the CBM improves on the BQM only 
by a median 23.75% for sellers and 34.03% for buyers. This finding suggests that the 
most impatient traders base their strategic decisions primarily on the best quotes. The 
out-of-sample predictive performances support this conclusion: the pseudo-R2 for sellers 
(buyers), for example, increases a negligible 7.82% (21.88%) from the BQM to the 
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CBM. Moreover, book-based models rarely do better than the relative frequency rule 
and the BQM probabilities outperform those of the CBM as many times as the CBM 
outperforms the BQM.18 
As a final empirical analysis, we compare the performance of the two-stage SOP 
model with the one-stage OP model. We repeat the forecasting exercise at the bottom of 
Tables IV and VI but comparing the CBM-SOP model with the CBM-OP model. This 
time, we perform the analysis both in-sample and out-of sample. Our findings are 
summarized in Table VII. We report the number of stocks and the percentage of 
observations for which the SOP model outperforms the OP model, in the sense that the 
former model attributes a higher probability to the actual event than the latter model. 
We find that the SOP model beats the OP model in-sample for 100% of the stocks and 
about 60% of the observations, both for buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders. The 
out-of-sample analysis provides similar figures. When we control for the type of order, 
we find that the SOP model beats the OP model in almost all categories, both in-sample 
and out-of-sample, with the exception being cancellations in-sample. The improvement 
is particularly remarkable for the most aggressive categories.   
[Table VII] 
6. Summary and conclusions 
We study the role the limit order book (LOB) plays in order choice by both patient 
and impatient traders. Our contribution is twofold. This is the first paper in modeling 
order aggressiveness using a two-stage sequential ordered probit (SOP) model. The 
 
18 We have also performed likelihood-ratio tests to compare the three model specifications. For all the 
stocks and for all the stages of the SOP model, the BQM model is found to beat the BM model, and the 
CBM to beat the BQM at the 1% level. Therefore, we corroborate that the book beyond the best quotes 
matters. Moreover, the chi-square values suggest that secondary levels of the book are more useful to 
explain patient traders’ decisions than to impatient traders’ decisions. These findings are available upon 
request from the authors. 
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SOP model allows studying patient traders’ order choices and impatient traders’ order 
choices separately. This is valuable because we are able to separate the decision of 
whether to withdraw, provide or consume liquidity, from the decision of choosing a 
particular type of order. We show the superior forecasting performance, both in-sample 
and out-of-sample, of the SOP model versus the traditional ordered probit model of 
order aggressiveness. 
We also contribute to the literature by considering the whole LOB, instead of just the 
best quotes, in explaining order choice. We distinguish between two pieces of book 
information, the best quotes and the book beyond the best quotes. We evaluate the 
relative improvement on the in-sample and out-of-sample goodness-of-fit performance 
of the SOP model when different pieces of book information are sequentially added as 
regressors.  
We find that the whole book contributes in determining whether a trader becomes a 
liquidity provider or a liquidity consumer, though the inside spread and the quoted 
depth at the best quote on the same side as the incoming trader are particularly 
powerful. Patient traders crucially rely on the book beyond the best quotes to place their 
limit orders. In contrast, impatient traders primarily depend on the best quotes. Our 
findings also qualify previous empirical studies: 
(a) The frequency of patient traders increases with the bid-ask spread, and decreases 
with the thickness of the depth at the best quote on the same side of the market. The 
thickness of the best quote on the opposite side of the market has an asymmetric 
impact. It increases the frequency of patient buyers while it increases the frequency 
of impatient sellers. The book beyond the best quotes reinforces Parlour’s (1998) 
“crowding out” effect. 
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(b) Consistently with Foucault et al. (1995), we find that the higher the bid-ask spread, 
the higher the frequency of inside-the-quotes limit orders. A wider spread also 
decreases the likelihood of non-aggressive market orders, increasing the frequency 
of the most aggressive type of market orders. 
(c) Patient traders base their order choices primarily on the state of the LOB on the 
same side of the market, while impatient traders mostly look at the state of the LOB 
on the opposite side. Patient traders submit more aggressive limit orders as the depth 
at the best quote increases, while their choice is almost unaffected by the opposite 
side depth at the best quote. Impatient traders submit less aggressive market orders 
as the thickness of the opposite quote increases. They take advantage of liquidity 
surpluses while adjusting the size of their orders to the available depth, as in 
Mendelson and Tunca (2000). 
(d) Consistently with Goettler et al. (2008), we show that a thicker LOB beyond the 
best ask (bid) signals that the best quote is too low (high). Thus, the deeper the book 
above (below) the best ask (bid), the more aggressive both patient and impatient 
buyers (sellers) become.  
(e) A lengthy book on the opposite (same) side of the market, decreases the 
aggressiveness of incoming impatient (patient) traders. 
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TABLE I 
Sample Statistics: Book and Activity 
This table provides average daily descriptive statistics on the 36 stocks in our sample, from July to December 2000. “Quote midpoint” is the 
average between the best offer and bid quotes. “Spread” is the distance, in number of ticks, between the best ask and bid quotes. “Ask (Bid) 
depth” is the accumulated number of shares offered at the five best ask (bid) quotes on the LOB. “Ask (Bid) orders” is the accumulated 
number of limit orders supporting the best ask (bid) quotes on the book. Ask1-Ask5 (Bid1-Bid5) is the distance, in number of ticks, between 
the first and the fifth ask (bid) quotes on the book. “Daily Vol./1000 (Trades)” is the daily average share volume standardized by 
1000(number of trades). The tick is 0.01 euros for all stocks and during all the sample period. 
Quote Spread Ask Depth Bid Depth Ask Orders Bid Orders Ask1-Ask5 Bid1-Bid5 Daily Daily
Midpoint (# ticks) (Book) (Book) (Book) (Book) (# ticks) (# ticks) Vol./1000 Trades
ACR 9.30 3.17 10571.1 14832.1 18.36 11.84 5.83 5.78 277.85 370.48
ACS 27.11 13.70 4028.2 4392.9 7.01 7.69 19.22 18.79 133.83 249.15
ACX 32.09 13.07 3701.3 3926.0 8.03 7.40 18.91 19.57 175.34 328.65
ALB 27.55 19.03 3083.9 3232.3 6.31 6.44 23.59 21.30 136.75 188.77
ALT 16.31 4.05 12583.4 11611.8 8.60 12.94 8.05 9.07 1131.46 773.14
AGS 14.19 6.63 5316.6 5719.1 7.47 7.75 11.24 11.29 171.98 232.81
AMS 10.23 2.84 14416.6 16484.7 17.03 12.66 6.33 6.14 1177.81 924.65
ANA 38.48 14.68 2955.1 2883.1 7.20 7.01 22.24 21.73 125.52 288.21
AUM 16.63 8.90 6913.5 6626.0 7.69 9.65 12.75 18.70 102.09 76.23
BBV 16.07 1.71 84451.5 53025.4 13.90 39.14 4.84 4.96 6974.52 2023.90
BKT 44.19 11.73 3694.6 3734.3 9.17 7.99 18.67 16.34 224.68 559.02
CAN 20.97 12.06 8585.1 5853.9 6.45 8.07 15.58 18.93 146.01 148.24
CTG 18.94 7.29 6700.7 6860.1 8.53 8.99 10.93 10.97 372.38 369.15
DRC 9.94 3.60 18047.6 11783.3 9.62 15.56 6.69 7.81 624.81 440.19
ELE 20.80 2.45 24505.2 22732.6 10.07 12.75 6.34 6.34 3099.08 1496.06
FCC 19.56 8.63 5168.4 5081.2 8.01 8.35 13.52 13.90 183.95 322.99
FER 13.92 4.96 5974.4 6629.5 9.79 10.07 8.90 8.74 191.16 396.99
GPP 4.40 1.71 42577.5 40534.4 20.56 20.38 4.45 4.50 1107.38 620.10
IBE 13.80 2.57 31215.0 27039.0 11.22 15.85 5.74 6.20 2112.56 758.00
IDR 17.81 5.87 5819.6 5662.0 9.01 9.49 10.07 9.64 290.02 530.90
MAP 18.27 12.12 6629.1 5302.8 7.10 10.03 16.58 21.56 130.70 116.61
NHH 13.09 6.26 11189.7 9085.4 7.43 9.29 10.02 11.47 357.15 232.24
POP 34.72 8.57 8096.0 5174.1 7.43 12.55 13.66 14.05 395.66 463.60
PRS 23.68 7.95 5207.0 5825.4 8.76 11.72 12.52 14.06 382.35 554.59
REE 10.66 4.49 7034.9 9465.6 10.03 9.66 7.75 7.69 160.62 279.86
REP 20.32 2.41 25296.6 24654.2 13.76 12.37 6.14 5.99 3528.20 1655.46
SCH 11.45 1.34 178610.4 115052.2 28.81 97.43 4.33 4.31 9719.32 2962.41
SGC 33.37 12.24 3056.1 3041.5 8.58 7.21 18.59 17.10 202.47 545.57
SOL 10.92 4.70 7633.1 8448.2 9.47 8.42 8.27 7.89 280.60 292.52
TEF 21.90 1.56 65666.8 56251.7 23.83 19.05 4.90 4.67 19714.10 6608.87
TPZ 4.92 1.60 50389.1 68614.1 40.60 20.30 4.45 4.38 1433.03 847.68
TRR 34.53 4.75 8983.2 8675.3 15.11 11.48 9.59 8.37 2935.99 4596.82
TPI 8.83 2.41 14769.5 17494.5 17.24 12.05 5.61 5.39 1133.28 1008.90
UNF 20.47 4.40 14094.7 19545.4 8.21 9.20 8.89 7.72 768.06 413.85
VAL 6.71 3.01 14156.4 12739.4 10.09 11.35 5.95 6.49 334.15 253.67
ZEL 34.95 4.25 6826.7 5900.9 10.71 11.15 7.78 7.52 865.26 1776.36
Average 19.47 6.41 20220.79 17608.74 11.98 14.26 10.53 10.81 1697.23 936.30
Std. Dev. (10.07) (4.53) (32720.8) (23084.8) (7.13) (15.41) (5.46) (5.69) (3677.81) (1324.33)
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TABLE II 
Statistics: Aggressiveness  
This table provides general statistics on order aggressiveness for the 36 SSE-listed stocks in our sample, from July to 
December 2000. We classify orders in terms of 7 categories of aggressiveness (C1 to C7). C1 are cancellations. C2 are 
limit orders to sell (buy) above (below) the best ask (bid) quotes. C3 are limit orders to sell (buy) hitting the best ask 
(bid) quote. C4 are limit orders within the best quotes. C5 are market orders for a lower size than the depth available at 
the best quote on the opposite side of the book. C6 are totally or partially executed orders that consume (only) the best 
quote on the opposite side of the book. C7 are totally or partially executed orders that consume more than one level of 
quotes on the opposite side of the book. In Panel A we report the percentage of all seven categories of orders over all the 
orders submitted for the 36 stocks in the sample. We provide the distribution of all orders (buyer plus seller-initiated) 
and also the distribution of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders separately. In Panel B, we report similar statistics 
for each category of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders but this time over the total number of buyer or seller-
initiated orders submitted, respectively. 
 
Limit Orders Small Market Large
Cancellat. Ab./Bel. At Within M.O. to Limit M.O.
A: Type/All orders (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) Obs.
All 14.41 13.45 11.05 10.89 40.39 6.07 3.75 7971432
Buyer initiated 7.49 6.93 5.69 5.73 21.37 3.04 1.81 4150054
Seller initiated 6.92 6.52 5.36 5.16 19.02 3.02 1.94 3821378
B: Type/Signed orders
Buyer initiated 14.39 13.31 10.93 11.01 41.05 5.85 3.47 4150054
Seller initiated 14.43 13.59 11.19 10.76 39.67 6.31 3.77 3821378
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TABLE III 
First Stage of the SOP Model: Estimates and marginal probabilities 
This table summarizes the estimation of the first stage of a sequential ordered probit (SOP) model for order aggressiveness with two 
stages. In this first stage, the dependent variable has three levels of aggressiveness: cancellations (withdrawal of liquidity), limit 
orders (provision of liquidity), and market orders (consumption of liquidity). In the second stage, the trader that has chosen to 
submit a limit order has to decide whether to place the limit order away from the best quotes, at the best quotes, or within the best 
quotes; the trader that chooses to submit a market order has to decide the size of his/her order: less volume than available at the best 
quote on the opposite side of the book, all that is available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book, or more volume than 
available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book. The estimation of the second stage is summarized in Table V. We report 
the median of the estimated coefficients for the 36 stocks in the sample, the percentage of statistically significant coefficients, and 
the percentage of statistically significant and positive coefficients. We provide separated results for buyer initiated orders and seller 
initiated orders. Additionally, we provide cross-sectional average marginal probabilities evaluated at the mean of the regressors. 
The marginal probabilities (x1000) measure the expected increase in the probability of each category after a marginal increase in a 
given regressor. The regressors, defined with respect to an incoming order, are: (1) Computed using the best ask and bid quotes: the 
bid-ask spread (SPR), the number of orders on the same side of the market (NS1), and the number of orders on the opposite side of 
the market (NO1). (2) Computed using from the 2nd to the 5th best quotes: the accumulated number of orders on the same side of the 
market NS25, the accumulated number of orders on the opposite side of the market NO25. (3) The distance between the best and the 
second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on the same side of the market LS12 (LS25), the distance between the best and the 
second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on the opposite side of the market LO12 (LO25). All models include one lag of the 
dependent variable. All the statistics are calculated across the 36 stocks in the sample. 
1st Stage - Withdrawing, providing or consuming liquidity
Sellers Agr(-1) SPR NS 1 NO 1 NS 25 NO 25 LS 12 LO 12 LS 25 LO 25
Median Coef. 0.2072 -0.0167 0.0279 -0.0332 0.0040 -0.0035 -0.0074 0.0215 0.0026 -0.0057
Significant (%) 100 94.44 97.22 91.67 72.22 52.78 63.89 94.44 50.00 61.11
Sig. & Positive (%) 100 0.00 97.22 2.78 69.44 8.33 25.00 94.44 27.78 16.67
Buyers
Median Coef. 0.1859 -0.0203 0.0495 -0.0220 0.0056 -0.0012 -0.0155 0.0262 -0.0066 -0.0059
Significant (%) 100 100.00 94.44 88.89 88.89 58.33 63.89 94.44 69.44 50.00
Sig. & Positive (%) 100 0.00 91.67 0.00 83.33 11.11 30.56 94.44 27.78 13.89
Marginal probabilities (cross-sectional means)
Sellers Agr(-1) SPR NS 1 NO 1 NS 25 NO 25 LS 12 LO 12 LS 25 LO 25
Withdrawing -38.607 8.226 -8.362 -1.045 -1.693 0.251 2.180 -5.399 0.757 0.234
Providing liquidity -26.688 6.294 -3.937 -0.329 -0.765 0.158 2.604 -3.725 1.197 0.494
Consuming liquidity 65.296 -14.520 12.299 1.374 2.458 -0.409 -4.783 9.123 -1.954 -0.728
Buyers
Withdrawing -34.735 9.760 -11.952 -0.034 -2.764 0.185 2.302 -6.582 1.173 0.144
Providing liquidity -18.223 6.218 -3.181 0.353 -0.666 0.161 2.757 -4.254 1.224 0.118
Consuming liquidity 52.958 -15.978 15.134 -0.319 3.430 -0.346 -5.058 10.836 -2.396 -0.263
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TABLE IV 
First Stage of the SOP Model: Performance 
This table summarizes the results of an in-sample goodness-of-fit analysis and an out-of-sample predictive-ability analysis of three 
different specifications of the first stage of a sequential ordered probit (SOP) model for order aggressiveness. In its first stage, the 
dependent variable has three levels of aggressiveness: cancellations (withdrawal of liquidity), limit orders (provision of liquidity), and 
market orders (consumption of liquidity). In the second stage, the trader that has chosen to submit a limit order has to decide whether to 
place the limit order away from the best quotes, at the best quotes, or within the best quotes; the trader that chooses to submit a market 
order has to decide the size of his/her order: less volume than available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book, all that is 
available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book, or more volume than available at the best quote on the opposite side of the 
book. The three specifications considered are: the Baseline Model (BM), which only includes the first lag of the dependent variable in the 
set of explanatory variables; the Best Quotes Model (BQM), which adds variables computed from the best quotes of the book to the BM 
model; the Complete Book Model (CBM), which adds variables computed using from the 2nd to the 5th best quotes of the book to the 
BQM. The regressors computed using the best quotes are: the bid-ask spread (SPR), the number of orders on the same side of the market 
(NS1), the number of orders on the opposite side of the market (NO1). The regressors computed using the additional 4 quotes available of 
the book are: the accumulated number of orders on the same side of the market NS25, the accumulated number of orders on the opposite 
side of the market NO25, the distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on the same side of the 
market LS12 (LS25), the distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on the opposite side of the 
market LO12 (LO25). The in-sample analysis uses data from July to November 2000 and the out-of-sample analysis uses data from 
December 2000. The table reports the in-sample adjusted pseudo-R2s of McFadden (1973), Maddala (1983) with the Cragg-Uhler (1970) 
correction, Aldrich-Nelson (1984) with the Veall-Zimmermann (1992) correction, and McKelvey-Zavoina (1975). The out-of-sample 
adjusted McKelvey-Zavoina pseudo-R2 is also provided. Finally, the table provides: (1) the percentage of stocks for which a given model 
is the best against using relative frequencies to predict the aggressiveness of the incoming order; (2) the percentage of stocks for which 
the CBM and the BQM outperform the BM on the basis that they usually allocate higher probabilities to the actual event than BM, and 
(3) the percentage of stocks for which the CBM outperforms the BQM on the basis of the same prediction rule.   
Sequential Ordered Probit Model
1st Stage: Withdrawing, consuming or providing liquidity
In-sample Ajusted Pseudo-R2s Sellers Buyers
BM Pseudo-R2
McF 0.0097 0.0079
MadCU 0.0220 0.0181
AN 0.0283 0.0233
MZ 0.0241 0.0198
BQM (% increase over BM)
McF 52.55 83.49
MadCU 51.87 82.55
AN 50.94 81.74
MZ 51.68 82.75
CBM (% increase over BQM)
McF 49.80 41.91
MadCU 51.48 43.06
AN 51.17 42.60
MZ 52.40 42.57
Out-sample Adjusted Pseudo-R2 (MZ) Sellers Buyers
BM Pseudo-R2 0.0194 0.0156
BQM (% increase over BM) 108.96 141.22
CBM (% increase over BQM) 31.39 40.11
Out-sample comparison CBM BQM BM CBM BQM BM
Best model against the relative frequency 47.22 22.22 30.56 47.22 16.67 36.11
Better performance than the BM 100 97.22 97.22 100
Better performance than the BQM 94.44 97.22
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TABLE V 
Second Stage of the SOP Model: Estimates and marginal probabilities 
This table summarizes the estimation of the second stage of a sequential ordered probit (SOP) model for order aggressiveness with 
two stages. In the first stage, the dependent variable has three levels of aggressiveness: withdrawal of liquidity, provision of 
liquidity, and consumption of liquidity. The estimation of the first stage is reported in Table III. In the second stage, the liquidity 
provider (Panel A) has to decide whether to place the limit order away from the best quotes, at the best quotes, or within the best 
quotes; the liquidity consumer (Panel B) has to decide the size of his/her market order: less volume than available at the best quote 
on the opposite side of the book, all that is available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book, or more volume than 
available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book. A positive estimated coefficient means that the associated explanatory 
variable is positively related to order aggressiveness. We report the median estimated coefficient for the 36 stocks in the sample, the 
percentage of statistically significant coefficients and the percentage of statistically significant and positive coefficients. 
Additionally, we provide cross-sectional average marginal probabilities evaluated at the mean of the regressors. The marginal 
probabilities measure the expected increase in the probability of each category after a marginal increase in a given regressor. We 
provide separated results for buyer initiated orders and seller initiated orders. The regressors, defined with respect to an incoming 
order, are: (1) Computed using the best ask and bid quotes: the bid-ask spread (SPR), the number of orders stored on the same side 
of the book (NS1), the number of orders stored on the opposite side of the book (NO1). (2) Computed using from the 2nd to the 5th 
best quotes: the accumulated number of orders on the same side of the market (NS25), the accumulated number of orders on the 
opposite side of the market (NO25). (3) The distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on 
the same side of the market LS12 (LS25), the distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on 
the opposite side of the market LO12 (LO25). All models include one lag of the dependent variable.  
Panel A: 2nd Stage - Limit order traders (Patient Traders)
Sellers Agr(-1) SPR NS 1 NO 1 NS 25 NO 25 LS 12 LO 12 LS 25 LO 25
Median Coef. 0.1017 0.0201 0.0733 0.0032 -0.0063 0.0059 -0.0838 -0.0074 -0.0081 0.0099
Significant (%) 94.44 88.89 88.89 8.33 91.67 22.22 94.44 16.67 66.67 19.44
Sig. & Positive (%) 94.44 88.89 88.89 8.33 0.00 22.22 0.00 2.78 2.78 13.89
Buyers
Median Coef. 0.0966 0.0167 0.0934 -0.0015 -0.0076 0.0030 -0.0888 -0.0149 -0.0062 0.0105
Significant (%) 97.22 91.67 97.22 5.56 94.44 33.33 97.22 30.56 52.78 30.56
Sig. & Positive (%) 97.22 91.67 97.22 2.78 0.00 27.78 0.00 5.56 0.00 16.67
Marginal probabilities (cross-sectional means) (x1000)
Sellers Agr(-1) SPR NS 1 NO 1 NS 25 NO 25 LS 12 LO 12 LS 25 LO 25
Above the best quote -33.986 -11.262 -21.943 0.315 3.252 -0.529 40.913 0.752 3.219 -1.496
At the best quote -0.688 2.111 -1.741 0.348 0.396 -0.036 -5.711 0.358 -0.060 0.451
Inside  the spread 34.674 9.150 23.684 -0.663 -3.648 0.565 -35.203 -1.110 -3.159 1.045
Buyers
Below the best quote -32.701 -9.672 -28.694 -0.283 3.346 -0.833 43.119 2.673 1.681 -0.562
At the best quote -3.144 1.429 -4.307 -0.004 0.673 -0.149 -5.068 -0.159 0.091 0.274
Inside  the spread 35.845 8.242 33.001 0.287 -4.020 0.982 -38.051 -2.513 -1.773 0.289
Panel B: 2nd Stage - Market order traders (Impatient Traders)
Sellers Agr(-1) SPR NS 1 NO 1 NS 25 NO 25 LS 12 LO 12 LS 25 LO 25
Median Coef. 0.1144 0.0424 -0.0099 -0.2878 -0.0020 0.0078 0.0123 -0.0212 0.0178 -0.0106
Significant (%) 97.22 66.67 27.78 100 58.33 63.89 36.11 63.89 66.67 55.56
Sig. & Positive (%) 97.22 66.67 2.78 0 8.33 61.11 33.33 0 63.89 5.56
Buyers
Median Coef. 0.1079 0.0304 -0.0306 -0.2401 -0.0058 0.0079 0.0220 -0.0269 0.0145 -0.0076
Significant (%) 94.44 86.11 38.89 97.22 77.78 66.67 58.33 80.56 61.11 27.78
Sig. & Positive (%) 91.67 86.11 5.56 0 5.56 63.89 52.78 0 58.33 2.78
Marginal probabilities (cross-sectional means) (x1000)
Sellers Agr(-1) SPR NS 1 NO 1 NS 25 NO 25 LS 12 LO 12 LS 25 LO 25
Non aggressive -30.580 -14.058 2.305 78.642 0.721 -1.773 -2.709 5.438 -3.822 1.853
Market-to-limit 14.876 7.802 -1.048 -38.792 -0.341 0.822 1.472 -2.733 2.111 -0.961
Agressive 15.704 6.256 -1.257 -39.849 -0.380 0.951 1.237 -2.704 1.711 -0.892
Buyers
Non aggressive -30.501 -16.578 5.159 71.845 2.758 -1.857 -4.369 9.654 -3.537 1.368
Market-to-limit 15.790 9.805 -2.535 -36.542 -1.426 0.909 2.502 -5.491 2.041 -0.801
Agressive 14.711 6.772 -2.624 -35.303 -1.331 0.948 1.866 -4.164 1.495 -0.568
Page 43 of 45
E-mail: quant@tandf.co.uk  URL://http.manuscriptcentral.com/tandf/rquf
Quantitative Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
43
TABLE VI 
Second Stage of the SOP Model: Performance 
This table summarizes the results of an in-sample goodness-of-fit analysis and an out-of-sample predictive-ability analysis for three 
different specifications of a sequential ordered probit (SOP) model of order aggressiveness. In its first stage, the dependent variable 
has three levels of aggressiveness: cancellations (withdrawal of liquidity), limit orders (provision of liquidity), and market orders 
(consumption of liquidity). In the second stage, the trader that has chosen to submit a limit order has to decide whether to place the 
limit order away from the best quotes, at the best quotes, or within the best quotes; the trader that chooses to submit a market order 
has to decide the size of his/her order: less volume than available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book, all that is 
available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book, or more volume than available at the best quote on the opposite side of 
the book. The three specifications are: the Baseline Model (BM), which only includes the first lag of the dependent variable in the 
set of explanatory variables; the Best Quotes Model (BQM), which adds variables computed from the best quotes of the book to the 
BM model; the Complete Book Model (CBM), which adds variables computed using from the 2nd to the 5th best quotes of the book 
to the BQM. The regressors computed using the best quotes are: the bid-ask spread (SPR), the number of orders on the same side of 
the market (NS1), and the number of orders on the opposite side of the market (NO1). The regressors computed using the additional 4 
quotes available of the book are: the accumulated number of orders on the same side of the market NS25, the accumulated number of 
orders on the opposite side of the market NO25, the distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) 
quotes on the same side of the market LS12 (LS25), the distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) 
quotes on the opposite side of the market LO12 (LO25). The in-sample analysis uses data from July to November 2000 and the out-of-
sample analysis uses data from December 2000. The table reports the in-sample adjusted pseudo-R2s of McFadden (1973), Maddala 
(1983) with the Cragg-Uhler (1970) correction, Aldrich-Nelson (1984) with the Veall-Zimmermann (1992) correction, and 
McKelvey-Zavoina (1975). The out-of-sample adjusted McKelvey-Zavoina pseudo-R2 is also provided. Finally, the table provides: 
(1) the percentage of stocks for which a given model is the best against using relative frequencies to predict the aggressiveness of 
the incoming order (2) the percentage of stocks for which the CBM and the BQM outperform the BM on the basis that they usually 
allocate higher probabilities to the actual event than BM, and (3) the percentage of stocks for which the CBM outperforms the BQM 
on the basis of the same prediction rule.  Table IV provides the results for the first stage of the SOP model. 
2nd Stage Sequential Ordered Probit Model
Passive Traders (Liquidity Providers) Active Traders (Liquidity Conumers)
In-sample Ajusted Pseudo-R2s Sellers Buyers Sellers Buyers
BM Pseudo-R2
McF 0.0037 0.0031 0.0019 0.0022
MadCU 0.0092 0.0078 0.0033 0.0041
AN 0.0119 0.0100 0.0043 0.0054
MZ 0.0107 0.0087 0.0043 0.0053
BQM (% increase over BM)
McF 131.04 177.32 1095.97 1005.21
MadCU 134.62 176.86 1104.73 976.90
AN 134.34 175.29 1088.45 956.08
MZ 143.11 197.91 3739.82 3128.25
CBM (% increase over BQM)
McF 272.94 221.91 25.78 34.43
MadCU 259.05 213.73 24.14 34.78
AN 250.48 207.29 23.36 33.62
MZ 267.34 202.79 1.85 13.54
Out-sample Adjusted Pseudo-R2 (MZ) Sellers-M2 Buyers-M2 Sellers-M2 Buyers-M2
BM Pseudo-R2 0.0107 0.0086 0.0054 0.0772
BQM (% increase over BM) 126.73 152.47 2097.78 1258.31
CBM (% increase over BQM) 334.57 325.53 7.82 21.88
Out-sample comparison CBM BQM BM CBM BQM BM CBM BQM BM CBM BQM BM
Best model against the relative frequency 91.67 8.33 0.00 88.89 11.11 0.00 38.89 22.22 38.89 27.78 19.44 52.78
Better performance than the BM 100 97.22 100 100 44.44 22.22 47.22 27.78
Better performance than the BQM 100 100 38.89 50.00
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TABLE VII 
SOP Model vs. OP Model: Performance 
This table compares the performance of a two-stage sequential ordered probit (SOP) model for order aggressiveness with a one-
stage ordered probit model (OP) model. In the first stage of the SOP model, the dependent variable has three levels of 
aggressiveness: cancellations (withdrawal of liquidity), limit orders (provision of liquidity), and market orders (consumption of 
liquidity). In the second stage, the trader that has chosen to submit a limit order has to decide whether to place the limit order away 
from the best quotes, at the best quotes, or within the best quotes; the trader that chooses to submit a market order has to decide the 
size of his/her order: less volume than available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book, all that is available at the best 
quote on the opposite side of the book, or more volume than available at the best quote on the opposite side of the book. The OP 
model considers seven categories or order aggressiveness: cancellations (C1), limit orders away from the best quotes (C2), limit 
orders at the quotes (C3), limit orders inside the quotes (C4), non-aggressive market orders (C5), market-to-limit orders (C6), and 
aggressive market orders (C7). Both models include the same set of explanatory variables: the first lag of the dependent variable, the 
bid-ask spread (SPR), the number of orders on the same side of the market (NS1), the number of orders on the opposite side of the 
market (NO1), the accumulated number of orders on the same side of the market NS25, the accumulated number of orders on the 
opposite side of the market NO25, the distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on the 
same side of the market LS12 (LS25), the distance between the best and the second best (the second best and fifth best) quotes on the 
opposite side of the market LO12 (LO25). The in-sample analysis uses data from July to November 2000 and the out-of-sample 
analysis uses data from December 2000. The table reports the number of stocks (up to 36) and the percentage of observations for 
which the SOP model outperforms the OP model in the sense that the SOP model it allocates a higher probability to the actual event 
than the OP. 
 
Buys Sells
SOP SOP
In sample vs. OP Obs. In sample vs. OP Obs.
Stocks 36 3506233 Stocks 36 3242140
% Obs. 60.28% % Obs. 59.63%
Out of sample Out of sample
Stocks 35 552053 Stocks 36 513959
% Obs. 58.72% % Obs. 58.60%
Buys - Aggressiveness Sells - Aggressiveness
In sample In sample
C1 Stocks 22 515523 C1 Stocks 19 474179
% Obs. 48.58% % Obs. 47.52%
C2 Stocks 32 474259 C2 Stocks 33 446853
% Obs. 52.70% % Obs. 53.92%
C3 Stocks 36 389114 C3 Stocks 36 365332
% Obs. 62.63% % Obs. 62.66%
C4 Stocks 36 388340 C4 Stocks 36 344202
% Obs. 60.73% % Obs. 60.27%
C5 Stocks 36 1413969 C5 Stocks 36 1278047
% Obs. 63.88% % Obs. 62.79%
C6 Stocks 32 206444 C6 Stocks 35 204115
% Obs. 64.57% % Obs. 61.24%
C7 Stocks 36 118584 C7 Stocks 36 129412
% Obs. 81.69% % Obs. 79.60%
Out of sample Out of sample
C1 Stocks 29 92207 C1 Stocks 28 87503
% Obs. 52.41% % Obs. 52.14%
C2 Stocks 32 78144 C2 Stocks 32 72537
% Obs. 54.70% % Obs. 53.84%
C3 Stocks 35 64379 C3 Stocks 34 62124
% Obs. 63.57% % Obs. 70.00%
C4 Stocks 35 68622 C4 Stocks 35 66836
% Obs. 60.43% % Obs. 61.23%
C5 Stocks 23 193036 C5 Stocks 22 168404
% Obs. 57.32% % Obs. 55.93%
C6 Stocks 36 36124 C6 Stocks 32 36902
% Obs. 67.51% % Obs. 62.31%
C7 Stocks 35 19541 C7 Stocks 34 19653
% Obs. 80.19% % Obs. 75.84%
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